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1 Introduction
The question of how to regulate and supervise large international banks has taken center
stage in the debate on the reform of the banking sector. The failure of internationally active
nancial institutions, such as Lehman Brothers, and cross-border banks, such as Fortis,
Dexia or the Icelandic banks, played a prominent role during the Global Financial Crisis.
As a consequence, there is a growing recognition that Memorandums of Understanding and
Supervisory Colleges are not su¢cient to deal with large and systemically important cross-
border nancial institutions. In the Eurozone, a banking union with a Single Supervisory
Mechanism at the ECB and a Single Resolution Board is being implemented, both as a
crisis resolution tool and as a necessary condition for making the Eurozone a sustainable
currency union (Beck, 2012).
The discussion on the optimal international nancial architecture is a complex one and
often gets mired in details. In this paper, we argue that this discussion should be guided by
a basic trade-o¤. This trade-o¤ can serve as a general framework for gauging the need and
feasibility of di¤erent forms of cross-border integration of bank supervision. In particular,
based on a simple model, we derive circumstances under which a supranational supervisor
is preferable to a national supervisor. Our model also permits us to analyze intermediate
forms of cooperation, such as minimum standards across countries. We then apply the
insights from the model to the discussion on the optimality of di¤erent forms of cross-
border cooperation that are currently being considered in the global regulatory reform
debate, as well as a political economy discussion on what circumstances make it more
likely that countries will delegate part or all of their supervisory authority to supranational
authorities.
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, several initiatives have aimed at closer
international cooperation to regulate banks (for example, principles and standards, peer
reviews and progress reports by the Financial Stability Board). One key insight from
the crisis, however, has been that such cooperation is most important at the stage of
intervention and resolution of failing banks, i.e. at the point where supervisors have to
decide if and how to intervene in a failing bank. There have been e¤orts to force bail-ins
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of creditors to reduce the costs of bank failure to taxpayers. In this context, there are also
reforms under discussion to lessen the impact of bank failures on the rest of the nancial
system and the economy at large. Recovery and resolution plans, also known as living
wills, for the largest nancial institutions, are an important part of these reforms.
The di¤erent initiatives to intensify cooperation among supervisors have seen di¤erent
degrees of success. Initial cooperation in the context of the living wills for G-SIFIS (global
systemically important nancial institutions) has been replaced by increased suspicion, es-
pecially between U.S. and European supervisors.1 On the other hand, in several smaller
regions, there has been progress. In the Nordic-Baltic region, a Memorandum of Under-
standing has been signed that includes ex-ante burden sharing agreements. Moreover,
a College of Resolution Authorities has been formed that includes ministries of nance.
Supervisors in Africa have taken rst steps towards closer cooperation with the establish-
ment of a Community of African Bank Supervisors. Cooperation in certain sub-regions, as
for example in the East Africa Community, has advanced even further. In the Eurozone
there have been attempts to move towards a fully-edged banking union, with a suprana-
tional supervisor and resolution authority. In spring 2014, political negotiations resulted
in a partial banking union, with a single supervisory mechanism, a coordinated resolution
mechanism based on national schemes, but no single deposit insurance fund.
The variety of experiences and approaches that are taken raises the question of what
kind of cooperation is optimal for which set of countries. Our paper aims to inform the
debate by focusing on the supervisory decision to intervene and resolve failing banks.
Specically, we propose that there are two dimensions that should determine the degree
of supervisory integration  cross-border externalities from nancial instability and het-
erogeneity of countries in the costs of failing banks. We model the supervisory decision to
intervene in a failing bank under national and supranational supervision regimes and derive
conditions under which either of the two results in higher welfare. The analysis shows that
higher externalities and lower heterogeneity between countries in failure costs result in a
higher likelihood that supranational supervision is welfare improving over national super-
1See for instance NY Fed warns on go it alone regulators (Financial Times, April 22 2013).
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vision. We also show that there is an intermediate form of cooperation between national
supervisors that can reduce (but not eliminate) externalities from national supervision of
cross-border banks, while at the same time avoiding most of the ine¢ciencies related to
heterogeneity in failure costs. Based on the analysis, we propose solutions for cross-border
regulatory coordination or integration for di¤erent countries and regions in the world, and
contrast them with current arrangements and policy initiatives. However, we also analyze
under which circumstances countries are likely to agree to di¤erent forms of regulatory
coordination or supervisory integration, thus providing a political economy analysis of the
di¤erent degrees of progress made in cross-border regulatory cooperation around the globe.
We show that incentive compatibility can seriously limit the implementation of a supra-
national solution. We also show that small countries  even if their preferences only have
little e¤ect on supranational decision-making  can benet more from delegation than large
countries. Finally, we show that biases arising from national supervision of cross-border
banks can also result in too lenient licensing of banks.
Our paper is linked to a small  but growing  literature on cross-border bank regu-
lation. Loranth and Morrison (2007) discuss the implications of capital requirements and
deposit insurance for cross-border banks and show that capital requirements set at a level to
o¤-set the safety net subsidy of deposit insurance result in too little risk-taking in the case
of multinational banks. DellArricia and Marquez (2006) show that competition between
national regulators can lead to lower capital adequacy standards, since national regulators
do not take into account the external benets of higher capital adequacy standards in terms
of higher stability in other countries. Acharya (2003) argues that coordinating capital ad-
equacy ratios across countries without coordinating on other dimensions of the regulatory
framework, such as resolution policies, can have detrimental e¤ects. Freixas (2003) and
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) show that ex-post negotiations on recapitalization of
failing cross-border banks can lead to underprovision of the necessary resources and iden-
tify an advantage of ex-ante burden sharing agreements in helping overcome coordination
problems between regulators. Holthausen and Ronde (2002) consider cooperation between
home and host country supervisor on the intervention decision for a multinational bank.
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Given that national regulators represent national interests, a misalignment of interests leads
to suboptimal exchange of information and distorted intervention decisions. Niepmann and
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) show that decisions of national governments on recapitalization
of failing banks are ine¢cient if national banking systems are linked through the interbank
markets.
More closely related to our paper, Calzolari and Loranth (2011) analyze how the orga-
nizational structure of multinational banks can inuence regulatory behavior. Specically,
organization of foreign presence through branches leads to higher incentives to intervene
as the home country regulator can draw on all assets. At the same time, it can reduce
intervention incentives if the regulator is responsible for repaying all deposits, including in
foreign branches. However, there is no heterogeneity that induces costs for supranational
regulation and hence no tension between the optimality of domestic and supranational
regulation, which is the focus of our analysis. Beck, Todorov and Wagner (2013) show that
di¤erent dimensions of cross-border banking (deposit collection, investment and ownership)
distort regulatory interventions in di¤erent directions. Similar to Calzolari and Loranth
(2011) the analysis focuses on distortions arising from national solutions and there is no
trade-o¤ with supranational regulation. The paper also provides evidence on intervened
banks from the recent crisis, supporting the theoretical analysis in that intervention deci-
sions in foreign banks are distorted. Unlike the previous literature, our paper focuses on the
intervention decision into failing banks and compares di¤erent national and supranational
regulatory arrangements. Unlike previous papers, we also focus on incentive compatibility
and political economy considerations.
There is also a more institutionally oriented literature on legal di¤erences across coun-
tries in the treatment of domestic and foreign creditors (e.g. Krimminger, 2007). Osterloo
and Schoenmaker (2007) and Schoenmaker (2010) discuss the importance of regulation of
cross-border banks within Europe. Allen et al. (2011) discuss policy options for the reg-
ulation of cross-border banks in the European Union. Schoenmaker and Siegmann (2013)
compare the e¢ciency of di¤erent burden sharing agreements to a supranational supervisor,
using data on the largest 30 European banks.
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The externality-heterogeneity trade-o¤ discussed in this paper mirrors a similar dis-
cussion in the literature on scal decentralization (see, for example, Oates, 1972). This
literature argues that the comparative advantage of centralization increases with the size
of interjurisdictional externalities but decreases with preference heterogeneity. The trade-
o¤ is also related to the literature on optimal currency areas and trade-blocs. Following
Mundell (1961), the cost of having a common currency is that countries are subject to dif-
ferent shocks (Mundell, 1961), hence their optimal exchange rate di¤ers (Mundell, 1961,
and Maloney and Macmillen, 1999). A currency area imposes a common exchange rate and
thus creates costs similar to the one from imposing a common intervention threshold in
our paper. The externalities in that literature are di¤erent though; common currencies can
be motivated without resorting to externalities between the members of the union (e.g.,
elimination of frictions from currency exchange is a key motive), but externalities arise
vis-a-vis countries that are not in the union. Heterogeneity and externalities play also a
role in the trade literature. In standard models of international trade, heterogeneity is not
a cost to trade agreements (as the optimal tari¤ is zero and hence independent of country
characteristics) but can threaten incentive compatibility as it will lead to an asymmet-
ric distribution of gains (see, e.g., Bond and Park, 2002, for an analysis of asymmetries in
country size). Externalities in this literature arise from trade connections among countries,
similar to cross-border banking in the present paper.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the key
trade-o¤ faced by supranational supervision, based on externalities and country heterogene-
ity. Section 3 o¤ers a formal model and derives the levels of externalities and heterogeneity
for which supranational supervision is preferable to national supervision. Section 4 ap-
plies the insights of the theoretical model and derives political economy implications of our
analysis. Section 5 extends our theoretical model along several dimensions and provides a
broader discussion on the optimality of di¤erent forms of cross-border cooperation in bank
regulation and supervision. Section 6 uses the theoretical analysis to discuss the current
status of cross-border cooperation between supervisors, while section 7 concludes.
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2 The trade-o¤ arising from cross-border bank super-
vision
Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, there has been an increasing realization that
the regulatory perimeter of banks has to match their geographic footprint. Many analysts
and observers, however, also agree that a one-size-ts-all approach to supranational regu-
lation is neither desirable nor realistic, as benets and costs from moving from national to
supranational regulatory frameworks di¤er greatly across di¤erent regions.
We argue that there are two factors that determine whether the regulatory architecture
should become supranational.
2.1 Cross-border externalities
The raison dêtre for nancial regulation is externalities from bank failure. After all, in the
absence of such externalities, bank governance can be left in the hands of shareholders and
other stakeholders  as is the case for non-nancial corporations. Externalities from bank
failures partly materialize at the domestic level, for example, by causing a credit crunch
in the domestic economy. Such externalities do not create a rationale for international
regulation since a domestic supervisor will be best equipped to deal with them. However,
the failure of banks in a country also causes substantial externalities for other countries 
and increasingly so, due to the fact that the nancial systems of countries have become
more interconnected in recent decades, along several dimensions.
First, externalities arise from cross-border activities of specic nancial institutions.
For example, the failure of a bank that has foreign assets will incur costs abroad, among
others by leading to lower credit availability to foreign rms. Such costs will not be taken
into account by a domestic supervisor, leading to ine¢cient decisions. A point in case
is Iceland (which from the perspective of the Icelandic supervisor had substantial foreign
assets and deposits) where it can be argued that supervisors had insu¢cient incentives
to control bank risk. Beck, Todorov and Wagner (2013) show that banks cross-border
activities distorted supervisory incentives during the crisis of 2007-2009. The implications
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for international regulation are straightforward: in order to avoid these distortions, the
perimeter of the supervisor should match that of banks. Or, put di¤erently, the benets
from moving to supranational supervision are higher for regions with signicant cross-
border banking activities.
This rst source of externalities is a problem for developing and developed countries
alike. As documented by Claessens and van Horen (2014), there are close ownership links
in banking across the world, which have been increasing over the past two decades. These
links have led countries to sign (legally non-binding) Memorandums of Understanding
between supervisory authorities and the establishment of Colleges of Supervisors. The
resolution experience with several multinational banks over recent years has made clear
that such arrangements might not be enough.
Second, in a nancially integrated world, there are plenty of other channels through
which a shock arising from failure of one bank can spill over to other countries. This in-
cludes re-sale externalities and common asset exposures, informational contagion among
investors, direct interbank exposures or counterparty risk. For such externalities and con-
tagion e¤ects to materialize, no direct cross-border links have to exist between two banking
systems. It is more likely to nd such externalities and sources of contagion in more de-
veloped nancial systems where banks focus increasingly on non-interest sources of income
and market-based funding and investment strategies (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).
Third, specic externalities arise within a monetary union because a country cannot
simply devalue its currency to regain competitiveness following a shock and hence may need
to tap  in some form or other  the resources of other countries. The costs from asymmetric
shocks are thus much higher in monetary unions. Further, relying on a common lender of
last resort might result in a tragedy of commons problem, as it is in the interest of every
member government with fragile banks to share the burden with the other members.
It is important to note that this externality applies on the systemic level, rather than
just for individual institutions. The Spanish cajas did not have any specic cross-border
exposures but their failure is at the core of the Spanish crisis, with repercussions for the
whole Eurozone. Similarly, Cypriot banks have not had particularly close links with the
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rest of the Eurozone (though links with other European countries, especially Russia, have
been close) but their failure has imposed stress on the Eurozone as a whole.
Fourth, externalities also arise from regulatory arbitrage. Banks have incentives to
move to jurisdictions with lighter regulation  such jurisdictions benet from an inow
of banking business but this will cause negative externalities for other countries if and when
lighter regulation leads to bank failure. Related to this, a cross-border nancial institution
operating in di¤erent jurisdictions might be subject to a regulatory run, leading to an
ine¢cient resolution process. Again the externalities are higher among nancially more
integrated countries since the hurdles to moving business across borders are lower.
Not all cross-border externalities are of equal importance. A crucial distinction arises
between externalities related to specic nancial institutions and systemic externalities. It
is mainly the systemic externalities that deserve regulation and supervision. For example,
the failure of international banks in a country may not a¤ect other countries much if the
banks in these countries are in good nancial health at the same time. This suggests that
the extent to which cross-border externalities are systemic is much higher in nancially
and economically integrated areas because in those areas the likelihood that banks will
face stress simultaneously is greater.
2.2 Heterogeneity in resolution costs across countries
If all countries were identical ex-ante, it would be easy to agree on the right structure for
international regulation and implementation would be straightforward. However, countries
di¤er in practice along various dimensions, which increases the cost of closer cooperation
and convergence.
First, countries di¤er in their legal and regulatory systems. This makes it hard to
specify a common set of rules and standards, forcing adaptation of general principles to
local circumstances. For example, while some countries are moving towards an universality
approach where international insolvency is treated as a single case, many countries adopt a
territorial approach where each country looks out for its own creditors before contributing
assets to pay creditors in other countries. These di¤erences do not only lead to higher costs
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of bank failure in the case of internationally exposed banks, but also to a higher di¤erence
in such costs.2
A second source of heterogeneity arises from preferences. Countries may di¤er for ex-
ample in how they view the role of the government in the economy (one consequence being
di¤erences in state ownership), focus on scal independence or with respect to their risk
tolerance. For example, a basic trade-o¤ in banking (and nance more generally) is be-
tween risk and return; e.g., lightly regulated institutions may perform better under normal
conditions but may be more prone to fragility, while heavy-handed regulation reduces the
risk but may also depress banks protability and their contribution to economic growth.
Di¤erences in risk tolerance can also lead to di¤erences in the costs of bank failure.
Third, heterogeneity can result from informational asymmetries. Such asymmetries
arise with respect to the health of another countrys banking system but also regarding
the most suitable approach to resolving problems under local conditions. Informational
asymmetries tend to be compounded in the presence of cultural di¤erences or a lack of
geographical proximity. A somewhat di¤erent case is that of asymmetric interests and
resources between home and host country supervisors, such as in the case of market-
dominating subsidiaries that form only a small part of the overall banking group. While
the subsidiary is considered systemically important for the host country, it is not for the
overall banking group and for the home country supervisor.
There are thus multiple sources of heterogeneity that decrease both the optimality and
the desirability of supranational supervision. The next section models heterogeneity as
arising from di¤erences in the costs that bank failure imposes on countries.
3 A model of optimal allocation of supervisory power
In this section we introduce a simple model to analyze the circumstances under which
supervision should be delegated to the supranational level and when it should remain na-
tional. The trade-o¤ will be determined by two factors: cross-border externalities arising
2See Claessens, Herring and Schoenmaker (2010) for a more detailed discussion.
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from cross-border exposure of domestic banks and country heterogeneity arising from dif-
ferences in the cost of bank failures. In our analysis we will focus on the supervisory task
of intervening and closing a troubled bank.
There are two countries, A and B, each inhabited by a representative bank. Both
countries are of the same size  an assumption which we will relax later. There are three
periods, 0, 1 and 2 and there is no discounting. In period 0, each bank raises one unit of
funds from depositors and invests it into a project. The deposit interest rate is to be taken
as zero.3 The return on the project is random. More specically, the project succeeds
with probability  and yields a return of R > 1 at date 2, while with probability 1   ,
the project fails and yields a zero return in period 2. The ex-ante probability of success is
uniformly distributed on [0; 1].
Both banks have a cross-border exposure of  (0    1), meaning that a share  of
each project is carried out in the other country. Note that while cross-border externalities
arise here from cross-border investments, they could alternatively also arise in the presence
of indirect foreign depositors or foreign bank ownership (Beck, Todorov and Wagner, 2013).
Besides direct cross-border exposures,  can also be thought of as resulting from other,
indirect, cross-border externalities, such as those due to common asset exposures and
contagion e¤ects. While we assume here cross-border activities that are symmetric (the
source of heterogeneity in our analysis comes from di¤erences in bank failure costs), this
need not be the case. We will return to the issue of asymmetric externalities in Section
5.2.
At date 1, each banks project probability of success, i (i 2 fA;Bg), becomes known.
Based on this information, a supervisor can decide whether to intervene in a bank or to
allow it to continue. If the supervisor decides to intervene in a bank, she can recover
the initial investment of one. This intervention can be interpreted in di¤erent ways: it
could be a liquidation or a purchase and assumption operation involving another bank. If
the supervisor decides not to intervene and allows a bank to continue to period 2, with
probability i, the project will be successful and the bank will be able to repay its debt
3This may be the consequence of deposit insurance with a risk-insensitive premium.
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and pay out the surplus to equity. With probability 1 i, the bank will fail. Bank failure
causes external costs ci. These costs include losses for borrowers losing access to their
nancing, cost of disruption for savers and creditors of the banks and costs external to the
banks stakeholders, such as contagion and spill-over e¤ects for the rest of the nancial
system and the real economy.
These cost of bank failure may vary across banks or countries and without loss of gen-
erality we assume cA  cB. Heterogenous failure costs may, for example, arise because the
cost of bank failure is expected to be signicantly higher in more bank-based economies
where there is greater reliance by enterprises, households and governments on bank nanc-
ing. Countries may also di¤er in their marginal cost of public funds (needed to stabilize
the economy after bank failure)  more indebted countries may nd it di¢cult to cope with
bank failures (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013).4 There might also be di¤erences in
terms of risk-return trade-o¤s where country A is more willing to accept the costs of bank
failure. Failure costs may also depend on bank types, with smaller more regional banks
imposing fewer costs on the national economy than large, too-big-to-fail banks.
3.1 E¢cient supervision
We rst consider the benchmark of e¢cient intervention decisions. E¢ciency requires the
supervisor to maximize world (utilitarian) welfare, consisting of the returns to domestic
debt, and equity minus external costs in both countries. For bank i, the e¢cient interven-
tion threshold is given by i, at which the expected returns from continuation equal the
return from immediate liquidation.
The return for the world economy if the project of bank i succeeds is R (occurring with
probability i), while the return in the case the bank fails is  ci (occurring with probability
1  i). The return in case of date-1 liquidation is 1. We hence obtain for the threshold i
4For a discussion on the external costs that bank failure can impose on the nancial system and the
real economy, see Beck (2011). In principle, intervention at date 1 may also incur some costs, however, we
would think that such costs are of lower order than those arising from bank failure at date 2.
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that creates indi¤erence to liquidation:
iR  (1  i)ci = 1. (1)
Solving for  gives
i =
1 + ci
R + ci
: (2)
E¢ciency thus dictates intervention when  < i and continuation when   

i . Note that
i , given the assumption of uniformly distributed shocks, is also the likelihood of inter-
vention (from (2) we also have that i 2 (0; 1)). Equation (2) thus shows that (e¢cient)
intervention becomes more likely when the failure costs, ci, increase (since 
0
i (ci) > 0).
The implication is that supervisors should be stricter in countries with higher failure costs.
Note also that cross-border activities do not a¤ect the e¢cient intervention point, as they
are internalized in the e¢cient solution.
3.2 Decentralized supervision
We now consider outcomes when each bank is supervised domestically. National supervisors
will only care about domestic payo¤s. This may modify the intervention threshold and drive
a wedge between the socially e¢cient and the domestic intervention point.
The intervention point for bank i can be derived as follows. If the domestic supervisor
intervenes at the intermediate date, the bank will be liquidated, in which case domestic
payo¤s are 1 and identical to world payo¤s. Where there is no intervention, the bank
succeeds with probability . In this case the pay-o¤ is R, which again is the same as
before. With probability 1   the bank fails. In this case there is no return for the bank
and the country in addition su¤ers the domestic share of the bank failure cost, (1   )ci.
Total expected domestic payo¤ is hence R  (1 )(1 )ci. It follows that the domestic
supervisor is indi¤erent to intervention when
Di R  (1  )(1  )ci = 1. (3)
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Rearranging for Di we obtain the intervention threshold
Di =
1 + (1  )ci
R + (1  )ci
. (4)
For  > 0 the intervention threshold di¤ers from that derived in the previous section and
is hence ine¢cient from the perspective of world welfare. The reason is that a domestic
supervisor does not internalize the cost of bank failure accruing abroad. In fact, we can see
from equation (4) that the domestic supervisor is more lenient compared to the e¢cient
solution (for  > 0 we have that Di < 

i ).
5
Proposition 1 Domestic and e¢cient interventions do not coincide (Di 6= 

i ) whenever
there are cross-border activities ( > 0). In particular, there exists a range of 0s for which
the domestic supervisor lets the bank continue even though this is ine¢cient (that is, the
domestic supervisor is too lenient):
Proof. Follows directly from comparing equations (2) and (4), observing that Di = 

i
for  = 0 and D0i () < 0 and 
0
i () = 0.
3.3 Supranational supervision
We next consider the case of a supranational supervisor. Compared to a domestic super-
visor, the supranational supervisor has the potential to improve welfare because he takes
into account the cost of bank failure in both countries. The disadvantage of supranational
supervision is that the supranational supervisor is assumed to follow a uniform policy
across countries, that is, he cannot set a di¤erent intervention threshold in country A than
in country B. Thus, his intervention decision cannot reect country-specic bank failure
costs.
5The counterpart to lenient interventions in domestic banks with foreign operations is excessive inter-
vention in foreign-owned banks (in which case the regulator will not internalize the benet of continuation
accruing to foreign shareholders). More generally, overall intervention distortions in international banks
will depend on foreign asset, deposits and equity shares. In particular, Beck, Todorov and Wagner (2013)
show that the presence of foreign deposits makes a national regulator more lenient, while foreign ownership
of the bank makes the domestic regulator stricter. In our model, we abstract from foreign deposits and
foreign ownership.
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The supervisor sets his policy S at t = 0, maximizing expected welfare in the world
economy. This welfare consists of the expected world payo¤s from the activities of both
banks:
W (S) =
Z S
0
d+
Z 1
S
(R  (1  )cA)d+
Z S
0
d+
Z 1
S
(R  (1  )cB)d: (5)
In equation (5), the rst expression is expected welfare arising when the  of bank A
is below the intervention threshold S (and the supervisor intervenes) and the second
expression is expected welfare when the health of bank A is above the threshold, in which
case the supervisor does not intervene. The third and fourth expressions are the respective
terms arising for bank B.
The rst-order condition for the supranational supervisor is given by:
2  (SR  (1  S)cA)  (
SR  (1  S)cB) = 0. (6)
We hence obtain for the intervention threshold of the supranational supervisor:
S =
1 + cA+cB
2
R + cA+cB
2
. (7)
Two point are worthy of note. First, and as expected, the supranational supervisors
decision does not depend on cross-border exposures. Second, it depends on the average
failure costs in both countries, cA+cB
2
, rather than the cost specic to the bank in question.
This introduces an ine¢ciency ex-post (equation (2) tells us that optimal intervention
should depend on the country-specic costs).
Proposition 2 Supranational and e¢cient interventions do not coincide (S 6= i ) when-
ever there is country heterogeneity (cA < cB). In particular, there exists a range of 
0s
for which the supranational supervisor ine¢ciently intervenes in the country with the low
failure costs but ine¢ciently allows continuation in the country with high failure costs.
Proof. Follows directly from comparing equations (2) and (7).
Note that without our assumption of the supervisor being constrained to a uniform
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policy across countries, supranational regulation would obviously be always welfare en-
hancing as it would then coincide with the e¢cient solution. There are various reasons
for why this assumption is sensible. The rst one is practical. Fairness in international
regulation dictates that countries cannot be treated di¤erently. For example, suppose that
a pan-European supervisor closes down banks in Southern Europe (because he perceives a
high c there) but lets banks of the same health in Northern Europe continue. This would
cause obvious political problems. Second, country-specic failure costs are not contractible
in reality. To see the impact of this, consider a slight modication in the model. Suppose
that instead of ex-ante heterogeneity in failure costs (that is, we already know at t = 0
which country has high and low failure costs at t = 1), failure costs materialize at t = 1
(only at date 1 the identity of the country that has high failure costs is learned and each
country has to the same probability of being the high cost country). So, at date t = 0
only the aggregate realization of failure costs is known but not which country has the high
cost). This modication does not change anything in the e¢ciency properties of the analy-
sis (since there is still one high and one low cost country). And since at t = 0 (when the
supranational agency is formed and countries have to decide on the threshold) the iden-
tity of the high and low cost country is not known yet, countries will have to implement a
supranational solution that does not vary across countries. A third justication for uniform
policies is information asymmetry: while the domestic supervisor may be able to observe
the failure cost of its bank at date 1, a supranational supervisor may not. The best the
supranational supervisor can hence do is to base his intervention decisions on the ex-ante
distribution of failure costs, which may be symmetric. Finally, actual regulation is almost
always symmetric. For example Basel-accords impose identical capital requirement rules
across countries, even though failure costs of banks in di¤erent countries are very likely to
di¤er.
Domestic intervention decisions are ine¢cient in our model because a domestic super-
visor does not internalize the cost of failure of the domestic bank for foreign stakeholders
in the bank. A similar externality arises when intervention decisions in the domestic bank
a¤ect risk-taking at the foreign bank. In particular, Shapiro and Skeie (2013) analyze a
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setting where banks are intervened sequentially. Intervention (or lack thereof) in the rst
bank can provide a signal to the second bank about the likelihood of supervisory inter-
vention and a¤ect the risk-taking of this bank. E¢ciency may then require to shut down
the rst bank for certain realizations of the failure probability in which it would otherwise
remain open. This is in order to contain risk-taking at the second bank. Such a channel
would provide an alternative rationale for supranational regulation: domestic supervisors
would ignore the benecial signalling e¤ect of bank closure on foreigners and create an
externality similar to the one arising from cross-border bank activities.
3.4 When is supranational supervision e¢cient?
We are now in a position to analyze whether supervision should take place at the domestic
or the supranational level. For this we examine whether supranational supervision leads
to higher world welfare. Expected world welfare under domestic regulation is
W (DA ; 
D
B) =
Z DA
0
d+
Z 1
DA
(R  (1  )cA)d+
Z DB
0
d+
Z 1
DB
(R  (1  )cB)d: (8)
The welfare impact of supranational supervision can be written as:
W = W (S) W (DA ; 
D
B) =
Z S
DA
(1 R+(1 )cA)d 
Z DB
S
(1 R+(1 )cB)d: (9)
We denote with c := cB   cA the di¤erence in costs across countries.
Proposition 3 The benets from supranational supervision, W ,
i) increase in cross-border externalities ;
ii) decrease in country heterogeneity c (= cB   cA).
In addition, there exists a function cc() with dcc
d
> 0 such that for c < cc() supra-
national supervision is e¢cient, while for c > cc() domestic supervision is e¢cient.
Proof. Using (4) and (7) to substitute DA , 
D
B and 
S in (9), we obtain W as
a function of  and c: W = W (;c). From this we can derive that @W
@
> 0
and @W
@c
< 0. Thus,  increases the benets from supranational supervision, while c
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decreases it. Since in addition we have that W (0; 0) = 0, there exists hence a functioncc() (with dcc
d
> 0) for which W (;cc()) = 0. For this function we then have that
W (;c) < 0 if c > cc() and W (;c) > 0 if c < cc().
How can we interpret this nding in the context of the discussion in section 2? High
externalities in the form of large global banks being active across several countries or in
the form of banks across countries being exposed to the same capital markets increase the
likelihood that supranational supervision is welfare improving. Similarly, high externalities
stemming from being part of a currency union increases the optimality of supranational
supervision. On the other hand, a high di¤erence in failure costs reduces this likelihood as
it increases the range of  where the supranational supervisor takes an ine¢cient decision
from the viewpoint of either country. As discussed above, such di¤erences can arise from
di¤erent nancial structures, scal policy stances but also political preferences.
Figure 1: Externalities vs. Heterogeneity: The case of Supranational Supervision
Figure 1 illustrates the trade-o¤ between externalities and heterogeneity. This gure
depicts cc() for a (gross) return in the case of success of R = 1:1 and failure costs of
c = 0:3 (note that this restricts c to be less or equal to 0:6). The area above cc() gives
the region where domestic supervision is optimal, while the area below this critical line
indicates e¢ciency of supranational supervision. We can see that the critical line passes
the origin of the coordinate system  which is to be expected since for  = 0 and c = 0
there are neither benets nor cost to supranational supervision. We can also see that
the critical line is upward sloping, that is, higher externalities have to be o¤set by higher
heterogeneity in order to preserve the neutrality of both types of supervision. In addition,
the gure also shows that when the externalities are only modest ( < 0:5) the relationship
between  and c is fairly linear. However, when the externalities are high (in particular,
18
for  > 0:7), the costs needed to o¤set them become very high. This suggests that for
sets of countries that display a high degree of externalities, supranational supervision is
desirable no matter how heterogenous the countries are.
In our two-country world the natural bound for  is 0:5. However, our model can also
be interpreted as pertaining to a world of 2n (n  1) countries, where half of the countries
are identical to country A in the baseline model, and the other half identical to country B.
In this world, a complete diversication allocation implies  = n 1
n
, which is only bounded
by one. We also note that banks that have more than half of their activities outside their
country of domicile are not uncommon, as for example the case of Swiss banks shows;
hence the analysis of the trade-o¤ for  > 0:5 has relevance.
It should be pointed out that the decision to delegate supervision to the supranational
level is in principle orthogonal to whether supervision is carried out in a rule-based or
discretionary way.6 Both supranational or national supervision can be carried out in the
form of a rule (set at date 0) or discretionary (at date 1). For national supervision there
is absolutely no di¤erence between setting the intervention threshold at date 0 and date
1. For supranational regulation, consider the following modication of the model. Instead
of each country being inhabited by one bank, let there be a continuum of banks operating
whose realizations of  are drawn independently. At date 1, a supervisor will thus face the
whole specter of ranges of  (by the law of large numbers, there will be realizations of 
in each non-empty interval on [0; 1]) in each country). The supervisor then has to decide
on a marginal bank to intervene, which by the symmetry assumption has to be the same
across countries. He thus faces exactly the same problem as from an ex-ante perspective.
4 The political economy of supranational supervision
So far, we have considered the optimality of supranational supervision from the viewpoint
of global welfare. But is agreeing to supranational supervision also incentive compatible
from the individual countrys viewpoint? This section discusses the political economy of
6Since risk is exogenous in our model, there is no time inconsistency problem here.
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delegating supervisory authority to a supranational institution. We rst discuss the general
case of incentive compatibility before gauging the role of relative country size.
4.1 Incentive compatibility
As countries are asymmetric in their failure costs, their incentives to join a supranational
solution are not identical. This creates situations where even though a supranational solu-
tion is optimal for overall welfare, one of the two countries would su¤er under supranational
regulation. In this case, delegation to the supranational level may not be politically feasible.
The following proposition analyzes this problem.
Proposition 4 Whenever cA < cB, e¢cient supranational supervision may not be incen-
tive compatible. In particular, one can dene a b0 such that
(i) for  < b0, there are parameter values for which the welfare of country A is lower
under supranational supervision (WA(
S) < WA(
D
A ; 
D
B)) even if such supervision is e¢-
cient (WA(
S) +WB(
S) > WA(
D
A ; 
D
B) +WB(
D
A ; 
D
B));
(ii) for  > b0, there are parameter values for which the welfare of country B is lower
under supranational supervision (WB(
S) < WB(
D
A ; 
D
B)) even if such supervision is e¢-
cient from the perspective of world welfare (WA(
S) +WB(
S) > WA(

A) +WB(

B));
Proof. The welfare impact of moving from domestic to supranational regulation is for
country A and country B, respectively
WA = WA(
S) WA(
D
A ; 
D
B) =
Z S
DA
(1 R+(1  )(1 )cA)d 
Z DB
S
(1 )cBd;
(10)
WB = WB(
S) WB(
D
A ; 
D
B) =
Z S
DA
(1 )cA)d 
Z DB
S
(1 R+(1 )(1 )cB)d:
(11)
Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3 one can dene ccA() and ccB() (with ddcAd ; ddcBd >
0) for which WA(;cc()) = 0 and WB(;cc()) = 0. These functions give combina-
tions of c and  for which a country is indi¤erent to supranational regulation. Next it can
be shown that ccA()  ccB() is increasing in  (that is, country As incentives to joint
relative to country B are increasing in ). In addition, we have that ccA() ccB() < 0
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for  = 0 and ccA()   ccB() > 0 for su¢ciently large . Since ccA()   ccB()
is continuous and increasing in , it follows by the intermediate value theorem that there
exists a b0 such that ccA() ccB() < 0 for  < b and ccA() > ccB() for  > b.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Since supranational regulation is based
on average costs, interventions will become relatively tighter in the low-cost country under
the supranational outcome: from (4) and (7) we have that S   DA > 
S   DB (for the
high-cost country, interventions may even become less stringent). Because of this, country
A will prefer supranational regulation less than country B. There is, however, also a second
e¤ect. Since costs are higher in countryB, the externality from bank failures in this country
are also higher. Thus, correcting this externality (by moving to supranational regulation)
is relatively more benecial for country A. The importance of the second e¤ect depends
on , the measure of externality. For small  the rst e¤ect will thus dominate, while for
large  the second will be larger.
Figure 2: Incentive Compatibility of the Supranational Solution
Note. The upper line indicates e¢ciency of the supranational solution (as in
Figure 1), the lower indicates incentive compatibility.
Figure 2 illustrates this point. The blue line replicates the externality-heterogeneity
trade-o¤ of Figure 1 (supranational supervision is hence e¢cient below this line). The red
line denes the incentive compatibility of the supranational solution: all points below the
red line refer to parameters constellations where both countries benet from supranational
regulation, while above the red line supranational is not desirable for at least one country.
In the area between the blue and the red line are hence the outcomes where supranational
regulation is desirable but not incentive compatible. To the left of the peak in the red line
this is because the incentive constraint of country A is binding, while to the right it is the
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constraint of country B that binds. We can see that incentive compatibility is a serious
problem as it signicantly reduces the area where e¢cient supranational regulation can be
implemented without violating the interest of individual countries. We can also see that
incentive compatibility is most "problematic" (as judged by the vertical distance between
the blue and the red line) when externalities are either very low or very high. For modestly
high externalities ( around 0.65), there are little incentive problems. The variation of
incentive problems across di¤erent degrees of externalities underlines the need for context
specic analysis of cross-border regulatory cooperation.
4.2 Asymmetric country size
Another source of incentive constraints can arise when the sizes of countries di¤er. Supra-
national regulation may then to a larger extent reect the characteristics of the larger
country, which may negatively e¤ect the incentives of the smaller country to join.
To analyze the impact of country size, consider the following extension to the model.
While in the baseline the size of each bank (=size of the initial investment) was one,
let us assume that the size of the bank in country A and B is wA and wB, respectively.
The bank in country i now needs wi funds at date 0, returns wi if liquidated at date
1, returns wiR at date 2 in case of success, and causes costs of wici in case of failure
(equivalently to modifying bank size, one may also change the number of banks operating
in each country). This simple scaling of operations will neither a¤ect the e¢cient nor the
decentralized intervention points (equations (2) and (4) still apply). However, it will a¤ect
the supranational solution as the latter applies to both countries at the same time. Welfare
is now given by the weighted average of the pay-o¤s from each bank:
W (S) = wA
 Z S
0
d+
Z 1
S
(R  (1  )cA)d
!
+wB
 Z S
0
d+
Z 1
S
(R  (1  )cB)d
!
:
(12)
Note that for wA = wB, this collapses to welfare in the baseline model, equation (5). The
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rst-order condition for S is
wA + wB   wA(
SR  (1  S)cA)  wB(
SR  (1  S)cB) = 0. (13)
Solving for S leads to the new intervention threshold of the supranational supervisor:
S =
1 + wAcA+wBcB
wA+wB
R + wAcA+wBcB
wA+wB
: (14)
The supranational outcome is hence determined by the weighted average of the failure costs
in the two countries, wAcA+wBcB
wA+wB
. The failure costs of the smaller country are hence taken
into account less for supranational decision-making.
Proposition 5 A countrys gain from moving from domestic to supranational supervision
may increase or decrease in the size of the other country (that is,
@(Wi(
S) Wi(
D
A ;
D
B ))
@wj
may
be either positive or negative for i 6= j).
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for why the impact of higher size of the other country can go either
way is that there are three e¤ects on the countrys benet from joining a supranational
approach. First, when the other country is larger, externalities from bank failures in the
other country are higher. This will either increase or decrease the benets from suprana-
tional regulation, depending on whether under the supranational solution supervision in
the other country become tighter or not. Second, a larger size of the other country will
mean that the supranational solution depends less on the characteristics of the domestic
bank, in accordance with equation (14). This lowers the countrys utility from operation
of its own bank as interventions are then less tailored to the characteristics of the domestic
bank. Third, the change in the supranational regulation arising from a larger foreign bank
will a¤ect domestic utility by changing the likelihood of failure of the other bank. This
leads to an improvement in domestic utility if the other country is the high-cost country
since then supranational regulation will become tighter and the foreign bank will fail less
(if the foreign bank is the low-cost bank, this e¤ect is reversed).
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The result of Proposition 5 is interesting as it goes against the often-voiced argument
that smaller countries tend to lose under supranational solutions if under such solutions
their characteristics are less taken into account. The reason is that a small country can
be subject to signicant externalities from the failure of foreign banks (simply, because
there are many foreign banks from the perspective of a small country). It hence has a high
interest in international regulation that addresses the cross-border externalities from bank
failures.
While in this section we considered asymmetries in country size as the source of incentive
constraints, incentive problems also arise when the externalities are asymmetric (that is, 
di¤ers across countries). For instance, suppose that country B is a nancial center. Most
of the costs of bank failure will then fall outside its borders, while the country itself may
be relatively little a¤ected by bank failures in other countries. For such a country there
are limited gains from supranational supervision (arising because it allows internalizing of
externalities). It may hence object to supranational supervision even if it is of benet to
countries overall. We will discuss this in more detail below.
5 Extensions
This section discusses several extensions of our model. First, we will analyze an intermedi-
ate solution between decentralized and supranational supervision. Second, we will discuss
the case of asymmetric externalities. Finally, we discuss how cross-border externalities of
bank failure results in biased decisions to allow banks to operate in the rst place.
5.1 An intermediate solution
Domestic and supranational supervision are two extreme solutions on a continuum of pos-
sible forms of cooperation on cross-border banking. In the following, we will discuss an
intermediate solution where countries commit to a minimum threshold for intervention.
Such solutions are commonly observed in international agreements, which dene minimum
standards but leave it free to countries to implement higher standards. They also retain
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the requirement of symmetry in that the same threshold applies to each country.
Suppose that countries agree on a threshold min, such that a country has to intervene
whenever   min, but is free to decide about intervention when  > 

min. Such a
minimum threshold helps to internalize externalities that tend to make countries more
lenient in their intervention policies. At the same time, by giving countries discretion
about interventions, it allows them to cater intervention policies to their own failure costs.
The next proposition shows that such an approach has appeal relative to the two
solutions considered previously.
Proposition 6 When  > 0 and cA < cB, an optimally chosen minimum threshold 

min
i) results in strictly higher welfare than under the decentralized solution (W (min) >
WA(DA ; 
D
B) +W
B(DA ; 
D
B) for 

min = argmaxW (min));
ii) results in (weakly) higher welfare than under the supranational solution (W (min) 
WA(S) +WB(S) for min = argmaxW (min)).
Proof. See Appendix.
The reason why an (optimally) set minimum intervention point dominates the domestic
solution is that it allows to implement e¢cient supervision in country A (by setting min =
A) without imposing any ine¢ciencies in the high-cost country B as this country is still
free to deviate to a higher level of stringency. It also dominates supranational regulation
whenever S < DB . In this case, when setting min = 
S country B again has the possibility
to deviate by setting a higher stringency, which would benet welfare. However, when
S  DB , no country deviates from a minimum threshold 
S. In this case, a welfare-
improvement may not be attainable under the intermediate solution.
Since an optimally set intermediate solution is never dominated by the two other solu-
tions, it is not instructive to analyze how the heterogeneity-externality trade-o¤ a¤ects the
desirability of the intermediate solution. In the following we will thus focus on a naive
intermediate approach where the minimum threshold is set equal to the e¢cient level of
country A: min = 

A. This can be thought of as the natural outcome in a world where
supranational regulators are reluctant to enforce regulation that is stricter than the one
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required for the low-cost country (i.e., it avoids that regulation is ever excessive for a
country).
Since min = 

A, intervention decisions will then be e¢cient whenever they are done in
country A:
IA = min. (15)
Country B may decide to be even stricter and hence to intervene sometimes also when
 > min. This is desirable (and also optimal for the country itself) since the country
has higher failure costs and hence also a higher optimal intervention threshold. However,
whenever  > 0, the country will not be strict enough from a world perspective and
supervision may still be subject to some ine¢ciency. Formally, intervention by country B
will be the maximum of the domestically optimal intervention for the country, DB , and the
minimum threshold:
IB = max[
D
B ; min]: (16)
How does the intermediate solution compare to the domestic and the supranational
approach? Comparing to the domestic solution we have that intervention will always
be more e¢cient in country A under the intermediate approach (as IA is fully e¢cient).
For interventions in country B two situations arise. The rst case is when the minimum
threshold is not binding. In this case country B will set the same threshold as in the
domestic solution. Where the threshold is binding, the country will set a higher threshold
than under the domestic solution. Interventions will then be more e¢cient as the threshold
partially forces the country to internalize the externalities. Overall, we thus have that
intervention is always more e¢cient in country A under the intermediate solution, while
it is at least as e¢cient in country B. The minimum threshold A thus still dominates
decentralized supervision.
However, the intermediate solution does not necessarily dominate the supranational
approach. Interventions are more e¢cient in country A, but they may be more or less
e¢cient in country B. In fact, a similar trade-o¤ as in Section 3.4 arises. On the one
hand, the intermediate solution allows country B to carry out interventions depending
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on the countrys own cost. On the other hand, the country will not fully internalize the
externality as the country will determine its own intervention level whenever the threshold
is not binding.
Proposition 7 The benets from supranational supervision relative to the intermediate
solution
i) increase in cross-border externalities ;
ii) decrease in country heterogeneity c := cB   cA.
In addition, there is a function cc() with ccI
d
> 0 such that for c < ccI suprana-
tional supervision is optimal, while for c > ccI() the intermediate solution is optimal.
Proof. Welfare under the intermediate solution is given by
W (DA ; 
D
B) =
Z min
0
d+
Z 1
min
(R (1 )cA)d+
Z min[DB ;min]
0
d+
Z 1
min[DB ;min]
(R (1 )cB)d:
(17)
The remaining part of the proof is analogous to Proposition 3.
Figure 3: Externalities vs. Heterogeneity: The case of the Intermediate Solution
Figure 3 depicts the trade-o¤ for the same parameters as in Figure 1 (R = 1:1 and
c = 0:3). The region where supranational supervision remains optimal is below the critical
threshold ccI . We can see that ccI() still goes to the origin of the coordinate system 
which is of course because whenever there is neither an externality nor a cost di¤erence,
intermediate solution and supranational supervision coincide. It can also be seen that the
gure shows a positive relationship between  and ccI . However, compared to Figure 1 the
relationship is now less sensitive to  in regions where externalities are high. It should be
pointed out that ccI is always below cc in Figure 1, indicating that there are now fewer
situations where supranational supervision is desirable. This is because the alternative
(intermediate solution) is now more attractive than in Section 3 (where we considered the
domestic solution).
27
5.2 Asymmetries in externalities
For the baseline model we have assumed that the sole source of heterogeneity are country-
di¤erences in the failure costs c. Two questions arise. First, does heterogeneity in 
create a similar trade-o¤ with externalities as cost-heterogeneity does? Second, is the
heterogeneity-externality trade-o¤ robust to introducing asymmetries in ?
Consider rst the question of whether -heterogeneity creates its own trade-o¤. For
this we modify the baseline model such that we now have A  B (beta-heterogeneity)
but cA = cB = c (no cost-heterogeneity). The intervention thresholds for the e¢cient, the
decentralized and the supranational solution are then (similar to equation (2), (4), (7)):
 =
1 + c
R + c
; (18)
Di =
1 + (1  i)c
R + (1  i)c
; (19)
S =
1 + c
R + c
: (20)
We can see that as long as i > 0, domestic interventions are still ine¢cient (
D
i <
) as they ignore the cross-border externalities. However, the supranational solution is
now identical to the e¢cient one (S = ). Intuitively, this is because an asymmetric
distribution of the failure costs among countries (di¤erences in 0s) does not a¤ect the
e¢cient intervention point ( is now the same across countries). There is thus no longer
a cost to supranational regulation, which previously arose because it imposed a symmetric
threshold across countries who actually required di¤erent interventions. The lesson is thus
that a trade-o¤ is created by heterogeneity in the e¢cient intervention points but not by
heterogeneity in the decentralized solutions. A corollary of this is that the supranational
solution is always optimal among countries with the same failure costs, even if externalities
from cross-border banking vary across the countries.
The next question is what happens to the trade-o¤ of the baseline model if we allow 
to vary across countries. We now permit A 6= B and cA 6= cB. As before, introducing -
heterogeneity does neither a¤ect the e¢cient intervention points i nor the supranational
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intervention point, S, which are still given by equation (2) and (7), respectively. Replacing
 with i in equation (4), we obtain for the new decentralized intervention point of country
i:
Di =
1 + (1  i)ci
R + (1  i)ci
: (21)
The welfare impact of moving from domestic to supranational regulation is still given by
equation (9), but now with Di as given above. We denote with  :=
A+B
2
the average
cross-border externality in the economy and with 4 = B   A the beta-heterogeneity.
Proposition 8 When there is asymmetry in externalities (A 6= B), the benets from
supranational regulation W
i) increase in average cross-border externalities ;
ii) can decrease or increase in country heterogeneity 4c.
Proof. See Appendix.
The reason for why cost heterogeneity may now also increase the benets from supra-
national regulation is the following. When A is smaller than B, an increase in cost
asymmetry may also increase externalities. The total cross-border externality that would
arise from the failure of both banks is AcA + BcB = A(c   4c) + B(c +4c), which
is increasing in 4c whenever B > A. Cost asymmetries and externalities cannot be
separated in this case and hence the trade-o¤ cannot be analyzed.
5.3 Biases in the decision to let banks operate
Our analysis has focused on intervention decisions at t = 1. However, the fact that a bank
operates across borders has also implications for the incentives for letting banks operate
at t = 0. To see this, let us modify the model and assume that liquidation of the bank
at date 1 only returns l  1. Hence, it is no longer clear that letting the bank operate is
optimal.
We rst analyze the decision to allow the bank to invest at t = 0 for an (exogenously)
given intervention decision, denoted b. This decision can be interpreted in a strict sense
as whether or not to grant a licence to a bank, but also more generally as an action by
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regulators or supervisors that a¤ect the incentives of a bank to invest in a project. For
instance, tighter capital regulation may make certain investments uneconomical.
World welfare (net of cost of investment at t = 0) from letting a bank operate is l   1
when the bank is liquidated (occurring when   b) and R   (1   )cA   1 otherwise
(same as in the baseline model). In expected terms we have thus
W ni (
b) = Z b
0
ld+
Z 1
b
(R  (1  )cA)d  1: (22)
By contrast, the domestic supervisor only perceives costs of (1   )cA when a bank fails.
Domestic welfare is thus
W
n;D
i (
b) = Z b
0
ld+
Z 1
b
(R  (1  )(1  )cA)d  1: (23)
For  > 0 we have that W n;Di () > W
n
i (), that is, the domestic benets from operating
the bank are higher than the benets for world welfare. From this we can conclude
Proposition 9 For given intervention threshold b (0 < b < 1), the domestic decision to let
a bank operate may be ine¢cient. In particular, whenever  > 0 there are parameter values
for which it is not e¢cient to let the bank operate, but a domestic supervisor nevertheless
would let it operate.
Proof. We have that W ni (
b) < 0 for R = 0 and W ni (b) > 0 for su¢ciently large R.
Since W ni is monotonically and continuously increasing in R, there exists thus an bR at
which W ni (
b) = 0 (intermediate value theorem). Consider a very small " (" > 0). ForbR   " we then have W ni (b) < 0 but W n;Di (b) > 0 (since W n;Di (b) > W ni (b)). There exist
thus parameter values for which it is not optimal to let the bank operate, but a domestic
supervisor would nevertheless choose to let it operate.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The domestic supervisor does not inter-
nalize the foreign costs of bank failures. She hence perceives higher benets from operating
the bank than warranted from the perspective of world welfare.
Another question is whether there is any bias in letting banks operating at t = 0
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when intervention thresholds are endogenous. That is, we can compare the decision of the
domestic supervisor to let the bank operate at t = 0 given that she will also set  = Di ,
with the decision whether the bank should be operated in a rst-best world (that is, is it
e¢cient to run the bank at t = 0 given that liquidations are set e¢ciently at i ).
The domestic benet from letting the bank operate is now given by (replacing b with
Di in equation (23)):
W
n;D
i (
D
i ) =
Z Di
0
ld+
Z 1
Di
(R  (1  )(1  )cA)d  1: (24)
We have W n;Di (
D
i )  W
n;D
i (

i ) (that is, domestic benets are at least as high under
the decentralized solution than under any other intervention threshold). Otherwise Di
would not maximize the benets of the domestic supervisor. From this it follows that
W
n;D
i (
D
i ) > W
n
i (
) since we have W n;Di (
b) > W ni (b) for arbitrary  as shown above.
Thus, the domestic benets from operating the bank are still higher. This leads to the
following proposition:
Proposition 10 Whenever  > 0, the domestic supervisors decision to let a bank operate
at t = 0 with an intervention threshold of  = Di is biased relative to the rst best with
an intervention threshold i . In particular, there are parameter values for which it is not
e¢cient to let the bank operate, but the domestic supervisor nevertheless lets it operate.
Proof. Since Di = argmaxW
n;D
i () we have that W
n;D
i (
D
i )  W
n;D
i (
b) for arbitraryb. The rest of the proof is analogous to Proposition 9.
There are now two reasons for this bias. First, as in Proposition 9 there is the bias
arising from the fact that for given intervention threshold, the domestic cost of letting the
bank operate are lower then the social cost (due to the externality). Second, the domestic
supervisor will choose an intervention threshold that is more lenient than the e¢cient one.
This further increases the domestic benets from operating the bank.7
7Note that there is no straightforward way to analyze the bias for a supranational regulator to let a
bank operate because her intervention decision depends on the characteristics of the other bank as well.
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A corollary of the last point is that the ex-ante decision whether to let a bank operate
will be less subject to ine¢ciencies if the ex-post intervention decision is on the supra-
national level. In the context of the European Banking Union, this would mean that the
decision to delegate intervention powers for large banks to the ECB has alleviated the need
for having also supranational control over the operation of banks.
Proposition (9) and (10) suggest that in a world where banks are domestically licensed
and supervised, we have too many banks operating. This argument is independent of
the normal reasoning relying on subsidies for banks arising from bailouts and deposit
insurance, and is solely due to cross-border activities of banks. Our model thus suggests
that cross-border banking without appropriate cross-border regulatory cooperation can
result in overbanking.
It should be noted that the decision of whether or not to delegate the t = 0 decision
to the supranational level is subject to the same trade-o¤ as the one for the decision at
t = 1 . In particular, when a supranational decision-maker determines whether to let both
banks operate or not, there will be costs in the presence of heterogeneity (when cA < cB, it
might be optimal to let bank A operate but not bank B). On the upside, a supranational
regulator can eliminate the bias that domestic decisions are subject to, as analyzed above.
The last section of the appendix shows this formally.
6 Implications for the debate on supranational super-
vision
In this section we will apply the insights from the theoretical analysis to the policy dis-
cussion on cross-border bank regulation and supervision. The baseline model has dis-
criminated between two possible solutions (national and supranational supervision). In
reality, there is a continuum of solutions, reecting di¤erent degrees of cooperation (such
as through minimum intervention thresholds). We can use the insights of our model to
discuss these di¤erent forms of cooperation. The key challenge for an appropriate approach
is to overcome externalities while at the same time being adequate for di¤erent degrees of
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heterogeneity.
Regions and countries di¤er markedly regarding the extent to which their banks pose
externalities to other banks but also how heterogeneous their economies and banking sys-
tems are. This leads to the straightforward but important conclusion that the optimal
degree of cross-border regulatory convergence also di¤ers across regions. In particular,
applying our trade-o¤, homogenous regions with strong externalities should implement a
large degree of common supervision. On the other end of the spectrum, the gains from
supranational supervision are the lowest for heterogeneous regions in which cross-border
externalities are limited.
6.1 Solutions in the case of low externalities
Low externalities do not call for heavy institutional solutions. Nevertheless, the exact
arrangements should depend on the heterogeneity of the countries involved. In the case
of high heterogeneity, simple solutions, such as Supervisory Colleges and Memorandums
of Understanding (MoUs) for information exchange and cooperation between home and
host country supervisors su¢ce. In addition, countries can carry out joint crisis simulation
exercises or even develop joint crisis management plans. This is the case for countries that
have very low shares of cross-border banks and have limited integration with international
nancial markets, such as, e.g., India, a country with limited foreign bank participation
and still some capital account restrictions. In the context of our model, such cooperation
will imply domestic solutions but with potentially lower external costs c.
Countries that are more homogenous in their legal and regulatory structure (or because
they pursue the joint goal of nancial integration) and whose bank failure costs are therefore
more similar, can go a step further and establish colleges of bank resolution authorities,
that include not only supervisors, but also other stakeholders involved in the resolution of
banks, including deposit insurers and, critically, Ministry of Finance o¢cials representing
tax payers. Such countries can also try to achieve convergence in cross-border regulatory
frameworks. An example of a relatively homogenous but not yet nancially well integrated
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region is the East African community.8 Such a solution might be similar to the intermediate
solution we discussed above, with a common intervention threshold.
6.2 Solutions in the case of high externalities
High externalities call for institutional and regulatory solutions that go beyond those de-
scribed above. In most cases, this also means surpassing the arrangements that were in
place before the 2007 crisis. We argue that one can broadly distinguish between four dif-
ferent cases, which reect di¤erent degrees of heterogeneity across the countries involved.
A rst case arises between nancially well integrated regions that are nevertheless rel-
atively heterogeneous, such as the U.S. and Europe or Continental Europe and the UK.
In such a situation, moving supervision completely to the supranational level is too costly
and politically infeasible. Our model suggests this would not be welfare improving, both
on the aggregate level but also most likely not for individual countries. This suggests that
e¤orts should therefore rather focus on removing the largest externalities and distortions
in the regulatory process and achieving a certain degree of convergence. Given the political
constraints and legal di¤erences, such arrangements have to be partly on an institution-
specic basis (e.g. SIFIs) or joint support structures for specic nancial markets, such as
standing foreign exchange swap facilities (Allen et al., 2011). The current trend towards
resolution and recovery plans (living wills) can be exploited in this context. We can also
learn here from the experience with Lehman Brothers, where resolution over the weekend
was not possible due to, among many other factors, legal di¤erences between UK and US
regulatory and corporate governance frameworks. This emphasizes that living wills for
cross-border SIFIs should be developed under the joint supervision of all relevant super-
visory and resolution authorities. In the context of our model, these e¤orts would lead
to a lowering of the bank failure costs in both countries, while staying with the domestic
solution.
8While most of the East African countries (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda) have had
historically a high share of non-African banks, there has been a recent trend for Kenyan banks to expand
across the other four countries, with several banks from these countries also planning to expand across
East Africa.
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A second case arises when externalities among heterogeneous regions are very asym-
metric. While externalities between the US and Europe are probably fairly balanced in
that European banks su¤er from US bank failures similarly as US banks from European
failures, this is not the case among countries that are predominantly either home or host
to cross-border banks. For small host countries, where subsidiaries of large multinational
banks are market-dominant but constitute only a small part of the overall banking group,
there is little chance for an inuential voice in the supervisory process, while at the same
time, these countries face high external costs from the failure of such banks. In the context
of our model, this would imply a small weight in the decision of a supranational supervisor,
while at the same time a high c, so that any supranational decision process would be too le-
nient. While our analysis in section 4.2 suggests that small countries may also benet from
supranational solutions, this might not be the case for the large home countries. Insisting
on stand-alone subsidiaries that can be relatively easily re-walled in times of crises might
therefore be the preferred option for host country regulators, such as in many African and
Latin American countries. While this entails a certain e¢ciency cost as subsidiaries cannot
as easily exploit scale economies, this disadvantage might be more than outweighed by the
benets that arise because host countries have better incentives to appropriately supervise
these institutions. For the small host country, this might involve lower external costs c, but
possibly also lower externalities  from bank failure, as the stand-alone subsidiary would
be treated as a domestic bank.
A third case arises among nancially well integrated countries that display somewhat
lower heterogeneity. This applies especially for countries with close economic and political
links, but that are neither connected through a currency union nor coordinate their macro-
economic policies. For such countries, a complete supranational approach may still be
too costly an option. However, the optimal level of supranational supervision in this case
goes beyond the previous cases as these countries can implement strong ex-ante burden
sharing and resolution agreements. The MoU for burden sharing among the Nordic-Baltic
countries is an example of such an arrangement. In the context of our model, this could be
the intermediate option of ex-ante agreed intervention thresholds. The adoption of such an
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agreement is also facilitated by the fact that externalities seem relatively evenly distributed
and there is no dominating member, so that there are fewer political economy obstacles
than in more asymmetric country groupings. Members of the EU that are currently not
part of the Eurozone could benet from similar arrangements.
Finally, there is the case of currency unions, possibly coupled with joint macroeconomic
policies. For such regions externalities are very high because of the high degree of inter-
dependence but also because asymmetric shocks are more costly within currency unions
as previously discussed. At the same time, such countries will display limited (ex-ante)
heterogeneity in the failure costs of banks. Thus, our analysis calls for a high degree of
supranational delegation in this case. Such delegation should result in a joint bank super-
vision and resolution framework, with a central resolution authority that has both powers
and resources to intervene in failing banks. However, our model can also explain the exis-
tence of political economy obstacles to such an agreement if heterogeneity in bank failure
costs is correlated with country size.9 Our model can also explain why the adoption of an
ex-post banking union will not be politically feasible, as ex-post heterogeneity will always
be higher than ex-ante heterogeneity. This underlines the importance of di¤erentiating
between the resolution of legacy problems and forward looking institutional solutions in
the context of the current Eurozone crisis (Beck, 2012).
6.3 The role for international bodies
Our tailored approach to international supervision does not deal well with the problem of
regulatory arbitrage across jurisdictions, and related to this, the incentives for supervisors
to engage in a race-to-the-bottom. In particular, countries that are not strongly integrated
with the regulatory system of other countries may develop very di¤erent standards and
requirements, creating space and incentives for nancial institutions to arbitrage across
jurisdictions. By doing so, they might impose high external costs on other countries and -
in the context of our model - face a low intervention threshold. In addition, these countries
9See, for example, the recent discussions on rules setting the extent of bail-in and thus distribution of
bank losses within the Eurozone ("Rush to EU banking union hits roadworks and diversions", Financial
Times, June 26 2103).
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may nd it optimal to refrain from closer integration with the expressed aim of becoming a
regulation-haven. The presence of jurisdictions with insu¢ciently regulated institutions
can pose signicant negative externalities for other countries.
This is where international bodies such as the Basel Committee come in. These bodies
typically limit themselves to issuing minimum standards and regulation but this is essential
for containing regulatory arbitrage. For example, Basel-style capital requirements put a
oor on how far individual jurisdictions can go in loosening regulation.
Another issue is that of coordinating across heterogeneous countries with di¤erent eco-
nomic interests and political weights. During the 2007-9 crisis, a consortium of international
bodies under the leadership of the EBRD convened regulators and banks from home and
host countries in Europe to avoid aggressive capital repatriation and a credit crunch in
Central and Eastern Europe, with some success.10 Similar arrangements might be nec-
essary to prevent regulatory runs across heterogeneous but well integrated countries. In
addition, a champion of the interests of small host countries of large cross-border banks in
Africa and Latin American might be needed, given the limited inuence with home country
supervisors in Europe or the US.
7 Conclusions
We have argued that there is no universally applicable optimal degree of supervisory inte-
gration. We suggest that two factors should be used to judge whether a set of countries
should delegate supervision to the supranational level at a given point in time: the degree
to which there are externalities of bank failures across countries and the extent of country
heterogeneity. Countries that face low externalities and are fairly heterogeneous should
only display a modest level of coordination, such as through supervisory colleges and com-
mon stress tests. Moving to the other end of the spectrum, nancially well-integrated
countries that are not particularly heterogeneous should have a strong supranational ap-
10See De Haas et al. (2015). In a broader sense, one could argue that International Financial Institutions,
such as the EBRD, can thus play an important role by internalizing externalities from cross-border banking
under national supervision.
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proach to supervision and resolution. The clearest case for a full supranational solution
is within currency unions  where externalities are very high and heterogeneity should be
low or can most easily be reduced. Currency unions should use an integrated approach to
the design of their regulatory architecture by moving both supervision and resolution to a
supranational body.
It is important to note that the optimal supervisory structure is expected to change
over time. Countries may converge in their institutional arrangements or overcome political
constraints for closer cross-border cooperation, e¤ectively lowering heterogeneity. Long
term trends towards more nancial integration (even though partly reversed during the
ongoing crisis) suggest that cross-border externalities will increase. This makes it likely that
supranational supervision will become attractive for an increasingly larger set of countries
in the future.
One important dimension we have stressed is that of the political economy of supra-
national supervisory arrangements. Even if supranational supervision improves aggregate
welfare, it might not be adopted if individual countries do not benet from it. The recent
discussions in the Eurozone on establishing a banking union are a good example of this.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider rst country A. The countrys gain (or loss, if
negative) from moving to a supranational solution is given by
WA = WA(
S) WA(
D
A ; 
D
B) = wA
Z S
DA
(1 R+(1 )(1 )cA)d wB
Z DB
S
(1 )cBd:
(25)
Taking derivative with respect to wB gives
@WA
@wB
=  
Z DB
S
(1 )cBd+wA(1 
SR+(1 )(1 S)cA)
@S
@wB
+wB(1 
S)cB
@S
@wB
:
(26)
The rst term,  
R DB
S
(1   )cBd, arises because a larger country B means that ex-
ternalities from bank failures in this country are larger. Supranational regulation will
hence benet country A more whenever it leads to a more stringent regulation in coun-
try B (S > DB); otherwise country As gains from supranational regulation will decline
(S < DB). The second and third terms arise because a larger country B means that
supranational regulation will become tighter as country B is the country with the higher
cost of failure (from equation (14)) we have that @
S
@wB
> 0 for cA < cB). This lowers utility
for country A arising from operations of its own bank since for this bank a lower threshold
is optimal from the domestic perspective (we have wA(1  
SR+ (1  )(1  S)cA) < 0)
but lowers the expected externalities from failure of the bank in the other country as this
bank is intervened more often which then benets country A (wB(1  
S)cB > 0).
Proposition 11 Proof. The net e¤ect is ambiguous. Suppose that  = 0. In this case
we have that
@WA
@wB
= wA(1  
SR + (1  S)cA)
@S
@wB
< 0, (27)
and the incentives to join are hence lowered following an increase in wB. Consider next
 = 1 and 1  wAcA+wBcB
cB(wA+wB)
< . From  = 1 we have
@WA
@wB
=  
Z DB
S
(1  )cBd+ wB(1  
S)cB
@S
@wB
. (28)
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This expression is larger than zero because 1  wAcA+wBcB
cB(wA+wB)
<  implies that S > DB (follows
from (4) and (7)) and the rst term is hence positive (the second term is positive anyway
as shown above).
Consider now country B. Country Bs gain from moving to a supranational solution is
given by
WB = WB(
S) WB(
D
A ; 
D
B) = wA
Z S
DA
(1 )cAd wB
Z DB
S
(1 R+(1 )(1 )cB)d:
(29)
Taking derivative with respect to wB gives
@WB
@wA
=
Z S
DA
(1 )cAd+wB(1 
SR+(1 )(1 S)cB)
@S
@wA
+wA(1 
S)cA
@S
@wA
(30)
The net e¤ect is again ambiguous. Consider rst  = 0. In this case we have that
@WB
@wA
= wB(1  
SR + (1  S)cB)
@S
@wA
< 0, (31)
since 1  SR + (1  S)cB > 0 and
@S
@wA
< 0 (a higher weight of the other country means
interventions in the domestic bank will be less e¢cient for the country). Consider next
 = 1. We have for the utility gain of country B:
@WB
@wA
=
Z S
DA
(1  )cAd+ wA(1  
S)cA
@S
@wA
(32)
The rst term is positive (since DA < 
S) but the second term is negative (since @
S
@wA
< 0).
Let now wA ! 0. We then have from equation (14) that 
S = B and @WB
@wA
simplies to
@WB
@wA
=
Z S
DA
(1  )cAd, (33)
which is strictly larger than zero since S > DA .
Proof of Proposition 6. Part i): Consider a minimum threshold of min = 

A.
Since country As desired threshold is less than A (
D
A < 

A, from comparing (2) and
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(4)), country A will choose the lowest permitted intervention threshold, which is A. Inter-
ventions in country A will hence lead to higher welfare (compared to the domestic solution)
as they are now e¢ciently chosen. For country B we may either have DB < min (= 

A)
or DB  min. In the rst case (
D
B < min), country Bs desired intervention point is also
lower than the minimum one and it will hence choose the minimum one (A). Welfare
in this case is higher (compared to the domestic solution) as supervision is more e¢cient
in both country A and B. In the second case (DB  min), the minimum threshold is not
binding and country B chooses the same intervention point as under the domestic approach
(DB). Overall welfare is still higher since supervision in country A is more e¢cient. We
have thus shown that there exists a minimum threshold under which welfare will be higher
than under the domestic solution. The optimal minimum threshold will hence also lead to
higher welfare than can be obtained through domestic supervision.
Part ii): Consider a minimum threshold of min = 
S. Since DA < 
S, the threshold
is binding for country A, which hence chooses S. Interventions in country A are then
identical to the ones obtained under supranational supervision. When DB < 
S, the thresh-
old is also binding for country B and it will hence choose S. The outcome is then the
same as under supranational supervision and welfare is unchanged. When DB  
S, the
constraint is not binding and the country will choose DB . Supervision is hence tighter in
country B (relative to the supranational approach) and since DB is still below the optimal
level (DB < 

B), interventions will be more e¢cient. Welfare thus increases. Overall,
there thus exists a minimum threshold that (weakly) welfare-dominates the supranational
solution. To complete the proof we still need to show that there are parameter values for
which an intermediate solution cannot improve upon the supranational solution. Consider
parameter values for which A = 
D
B (that is, the e¢cient solution for country A coin-
cides with the decentralized solution for country B). From (2) and (4) we obtain that this
occurs when cA = (1   )cB. We then only have to consider two cases for the minimum
threshold 1) min 2 [
D
A ; 

A) and 2) min 2 [

A;1). 1. When min 2 [
D
A ; 

A) we have
that min  
D
A . The constraint is hence binding for country A, which will thus choose
DA . We also have that min < 

A = 
D
B , hence the constraint is not binding for country
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B. This country will hence choose DB . The outcome is then identical to the decentralized
solution and in cases where the decentralized solution is not optimal, welfare will hence be
lower than under supranational supervision. 2. When min 2 [

A;1), the threshold will
be binding also for country B (since A = 
D
B). Both countries will hence choose min.
Such an outcome is also attainable under supranational regulation (by setting a mandatory
intervention threshold of min); hence it cannot lead to higher welfare.
Proof of Proposition 8. i) Taking derivative in equation (9) with respect to  gives
@W
@
=  (1  DAR + (1  
D
A)cA)
@DA
@
  (1  DBR + (1  
D
B)cB)
@DB
@
. (34)
From (21) we have that
@Di
@
< 0 (higher externalities make the domestic supervisor more
lenient) and that 1 Di R+(1 
D
i )ci > 0 when i > 0 (at the domestic intervention thresh-
old, the welfare gains from liquidation are higher than the gains continuation). It follows
that @W
@
> 0 . Hence, higher -heterogeneity increases the benets from supranational
regulation.
ii) Taking derivative in equation (9) with respect to 4c (keeping constant the mean
costs cA+cB
2
) gives
@W
@c
=  
DB   
D
A
2
  (1  DAR+ (1  
D
A)cA)
@DA
@dc
  (1  DBR+ (1  
D
B)cB)
@DB
@dc
: (35)
We have for the derivatives of the cut-o¤ points with respect to 4c:
@DA
@c
=  
(R  1)(1  A)
2(R + (1  A)cA)
2
 0 (36)
@DB
@c
=
(R  1)(1  B)
2(R + (1  B)cB)
2
 0 (37)
Consider rst A = 1 and B = 0. We then have that 
D
A =
1
R
and DB =
1+cB
R+cB
. It
follows that
@DA
@c
= 0 and 1  DBR+ (1  
D
B)cB = 0 (the latter is because when there is no
externality, the domestic intervention decision is e¢cient). The third and fourth term in
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@W
@c
are hence zero and we have
@W
@c
=  
DB   
D
A
2
; (38)
which is smaller than zero because of DB > 
D
A . The benets from supranational regulation
thus fall.
Consider next A = 0 and B = 1. We then have that 
D
A =
1+cA
R+cA
and DB =
1
R
. It
follows that
@DB
@c
= 0 and 1   DAR + (1   
D
A)cA = 0. The third and fourth term in
@W
@c
are hence zero and we have again
@W
@c
=  
DB   
D
A
2
. (39)
This term is now, however, larger than zero because of DB < 
D
A . Thus welfare can either
increase or decrease in response to higher cost heterogeneity.
The heterogeneity-externality trade-o¤ at t = 0. We consider in the following
the benets from delegating the decision power about whether banks are allowed to operate
at t = 0 to the supranational level. For this, let us denote interventions at t = 1 in
each country by bi (as special cases, these interventions may be the optimal domestic or
supranational ones). Similarly to equation (22), it is (welfare) optimal to let bank i operate
i¤ Z bi
0
ld+
Z 1
bi
(R  (1  )ci)d  1  0: (40)
The domestic decision-maker will nd it optimal to let the bank operate i¤
Z b
0
ld+
Z 1
b
(R  (1  )(1  )cA)d  1  0; (41)
similar to equation (23). A supranational decision-maker has to impose uniform decision
across countries, as in the baseline analysis. He can thus either let no or both banks operate.
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He will decide for the second option i¤
Z bA
0
ld+
Z 1
bA
(R  (1  )cA)d  1 +
Z bA
0
ld+
Z 1
bA
(R  (1  )cA)d  1  0:
Consider rst the case of heterogeneity (cA < cB) but zero externality ( = 0). The
condition for domestic operation becomes then
Z bi
0
ld+
Z 1
bi
(R  (1  )ci)d  1  0; (42)
which is identical to the e¢ciency condition (40). Thus each bank will operate precisely
when it is e¢cient. Under supranational decision-making, either zero or two banks will
operate. Supranational decision-making will hence be ine¢cient in all cases where it is
optimal to have only one bank operating (that is, when condition (40) is fullled for bank
A, but not for bank B). It is thus optimal to leave the decision-power in the hands of
domestic authorities.
Consider next the case of no heterogeneity (cA = cB) but with externalities ( > 0). As
discussed in the text, the domestic decision then su¤ers from a bias. In particular, there
are cases where it is optimal not to let a bank operate but the domestic decision-maker still
lets the bank operate. The condition for operation under supranational decision-making is
now Z b
0
ld+
Z 1
b
(R  (1  )c)d  1  0; (43)
which is identical to the e¢ciency condition. Decision-making at the supranational level is
hence preferrable in this case.
Taken together, the analysis thus shows that the optimal allocation of banking policies
at t=0 is subject to a trade-o¤ between heterogeneity and externalities as well.
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